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Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to prove that if there is a non-expansive
map relating the sets of optimal strategies for a convex polynomial game, then
there exists only one optimal strategy for solving that game. We introduce
the remark that those sets are semi-algebraic. This is a natural and impor-
tant property deduced from the polynomial payments. This property allows us
to construct the space of strategies with an infinite number of semi-algebraic
curves. We semi-algebraically decompose the set of strategies and relate them
with non-expansive maps. By proving the existence of an unique fixed point in
these maps, we state that the solution of zero-sum convex polynomial games is
determined in the space of strategies.
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1
1 Introduction
Two-person zero-sum games are widely studied. Those games represent
strategical situations where the income of an agent equals the looses of
the other. It is commonly used the linear programming in solving those
games. The most remarkable result, Von-Neumann’s minimax theorem,
guarantees the existence of a particular solution, but it does not solve
the determinacy or computation of that solution. One novel way to treat
those problems is by using real algebraic algorithms.
There have been important advances in the linkages of real alge-
braic geometry and game theory. Blume and Zame (1994) use them
for analysing the relationship between sequential and perfect equilibria,
and Bolte, Gaubert and Vigeral (2013) in the study of stochastic games.
They exploit algebraic properties of the fundamental sets to get informa-
tion of the equilibrium sets. Empirically, it allows to compute solutions;
theoretically, it allows to determine a particular solution.
In this note we are interested in studying the determinacy of zero-sum
polynomial games by using real algebraic geometry. These games are
those whose payments are linear or non-linear polynomials. We restrict
our analysis to real polynomials to be able to use tame topology and
real algebraic algorithms. This is a natural way to approach the solution
of those games, because semi-algebraic sets are defined by polynomial
inequalities and algebraic sets and functions are also semi-algebraic.
This question appears directly once the problem of existence is solved.
It is theoretically relevant since we would be searching for an strategy that
constitute the unique solution for the game. It is also a relevant empirical
question. With multiplicity it is hard and expensive to find a way for
choosing the best solution. Blume and Zame (1992) and Kubler and
Schmedders (2010) show the uses of real algebraic geometry in solving
that problem, by studing local determinacy of general equilibrium.
We start up by assuming that the sets of optimal strategies are convex
and compact. They are also semi-algebraic, because they are defined by
polynomial inequalities. We use the Karlin’s (1992,V.II, P.52) algorithm
to find out the fixed points. The semi-algebraicness of those sets allows
us to decompose them in semi-algebraic subsets. We relate them with
non-expansive maps whose unique fixed point is the unique solution to
the game. It determines the solution for a particular strategy.
This note is as follows. After this, we state some definitions on two-
person zero-sum convex polynomial games. Then, we construct the space
of optimal strategies with semi-algebraic geodesic curves in an example.
The result of global determinacy follows, and finally the references.
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2 Strategies
I and II are individuals. Suppose Λ ⊆ Rn is the space of strategies
being compact and convex. I selects x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Λ and II selects
y = (y1, ..., yn) ∈ Λ. Assume y = x by y1 = x1, y2 = x2, ..., yn = xn.
Let ‖pij‖n·n be a (n ·n)-matrix with positive coordinates. Let P (x,y)
be the pay-off to individual I. It is a linear polynomial function of (x,y)
P (x,y) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
pijxiyj
Let xi(α), yj(β) be semi-algebraic continuous functions in Λ. Let us
suppose 0 ≤ xi, yj ≤ 1 and xi =
∫ 1
0
xi(α)dzi(α) and yi =
∫ 1
0
yj(β)dzj(β)
with
∑
i,j zi,j = 1. Then,
P (α,β) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
pijxi(α)yj(β)
Definition 1 A zero-sum convex polynomial game is a tuple {Λ, P (x,y)}
with x,y ∈ Λ.
Definition 2 A vector (x0,y0) ∈ Λ is an optimal strategy for {Λ, P (x,y)}
if it satisfies the following condition:
maxx∈ΛP (x,y
0) = miny∈ΛP (x
0,y) = P (x0,y0)
Let F : Λ2 ⇒ Λ2 be an upper hemi-continuous correspondence with
(x,y) ∈ Λ2 in domain, and F (x,y) = (Λ(x),Λ(y)) ∈ Λ2 in co-domain.
An optimal strategy is a fixed point of F (x,y).
Definition 3 The sets of optimal strategies Λ(x0),Λ(y0) ⊆ Λ are defined
by the following conditions
Λ(x0) = {y ∈ Λ : P (x0,y) ≤ P (x0,y′)∀y 6= y′ ∈ Λ}
Λ(y0) = {x ∈ Λ : P (x,y0) ≥ P (x′,y0)∀x 6= x′ ∈ Λ}
The sets of optimal strategies are clearly compact and convex. Ad-
ditionally, they are semi-algebraic1. To see that, just notice they are
written by polynomial inequalities with P (x,y).
1A set is semi-algebraic of finite dimension if it is possible to write it as a combination of poly-
nomial equations and real inequalities. Any algebraic set is also semi-algebraic. A function is
semi-algebraic if its graph is semi-algebraic.
3
3 Example
Let us consider the classical and easy example of matching pennies.
It is a two-person zero-sum polynomial game. Table 1 shows the pay-off’s
of the individual I in the two strategies: H and T.
Table 1:
I’s payoff
II
H T
I
H 1 −1
T −1 1
Suppose player I chooses H with probability x and T with probability
1−x. Also, player II chooses H with probability y and T with probability
1− y. Now, the space of the strategies is convex.
By using Von-Newmann’s expected utility we write the I’s expected
pay-off as P (x,y) = 4(x − .5)(y − .5). It is a non-linear polynomial
function. We can approximate its surface by semi-algebraic curves.
3.1 Asymmetric case
Define the parametric regular curve r(u, v) for the surface P (x,y). This
curve is r(u, v) = [u, v, 4uv − 2u − 2v + 1]. We assume x 6= y which is
equivalent to u 6= v.
The Christoffel symbols of the first fundamental form are
Γ111 = Γ
2
11 = Γ
1
22 = Γ
2
22 = 0
Γ112 =
8(4v − 2)
2 [1 + (4u− 2)2 + (4v − 2)2]
Γ212 =
8(4u− 2)
2 [1 + (4u− 2)2 + (4v − 2)2]
Let s be the line element. The geodesic curves are:
d2u
ds2
= − 8(4v − 2)
1 + (4u− 2)2 + (4v − 2)2
du
ds
dv
ds
d2v
ds2
= − 8(4u− 2)
1 + (4u− 2)2 + (4v − 2)2
dv
ds
du
ds
These functions are clearly continuous semi-algebraic. There is an ap-
proximation to this curves in the figure 1.
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Figure 1: Utility surface
3.2 Symmetric case
In this case x = y = t or equivalently u = v = t. The parametric curve is
r(t) = [t, t, 4t2−4t+1]. The Christoffel symbols of the first fundamental
form are:
Γ111 = Γ
2
11 = Γ
1
22 = Γ
2
22 = 0
Γ112 = Γ
2
12 =
8(4t− 2)
2 [1 + 2(4t− 2)2]
The geodesic curves are:
d2t
ds2
= − 8(4t− 2)
1 + 2(4t− 2)2
(
dt
ds
)2
The equation of the line element is ds =
√
2 + 4(4t− 2)2dt. With this,
we are able to compute the distance between any two points. In [0, 1]
the distance is the solution of a semi-algebraic equation:
s =
∫ 1
0
ds
dt
=
log(2
√
2 + 3)
4
+
3
√
2
2
≈ 2.5
The unique optimal strategy is x = 0.5 = 1 − x = y = 0.5 = 1 − y. In
this symmetrical solution we have P (x,y) = 0 
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4 Determinacy
We are going to analyse the determinacy of optimal strategies in zero-sum
polynomial games. Let ϕ, ψ : Λ→ Λ be continuous maps. Let us suppose
they are non-expansive, that is, ‖ϕ(x0)− ϕ(x1)‖ ≤ ‖x0 − x1‖ for every
x0,x1 ∈ Λ and ‖ψ(y0) − ψ(y1)‖ ≤ ‖y0 − y1‖ for every y0,y1 ∈ Λ. We
will restrict the domain and range of these maps to the optimal strategy
sets, and show there is only one fixed point for them. Notice we can not
use the contraction mapping theorem directly for this particular case.
We state our result in the following way:
Theorem 1 If Λ(y0)  Λ(x0) are continuous non-expansive maps then,
given x0 ∈ Λ(y0)(resp. y0 ∈ Λ(x0)), y0 ∈ Λ(x0)(resp. x0 ∈ Λ(y0)) is
the unique optimal strategy for the game {Λ, P (x,y)} with x,y ∈ Λ.
The proof of our result is organized as follows. First, we decompose
the set of strategies in semi-algebraic subsets by using the semi-algebraic
decomposition theorem. Second, we apply these subsets onto each other
throughout semi-algebraic non-expansive maps. Third, we find out the
optimal strategy that constitutes the fixed point of those maps. We do it
by selecting an appropriate semi-algebraic curve. Finally, we verify that
this is the unique optimal strategy for the polynomial game.
We state the proof in the following way:
Proof of Theorem 1:
1. Cylindrical algebraic decomposition
In this part we follow the algorithm in Karlin (1992,V.II, P.52) adapted
to the semi-algebricity of Λ(x0),Λ(y0). Let fj(x), gi(y) be semi-algebraic
linear functions of x,y ∈ Λ respectively.
Decompose the sets Λ(x0),Λ(y0) in disjunct, compact, convex and
semi-algebraic subsets Λj(x
0),Λi(y
0) by using the hyperplanes fj(x) = 0
and gi(y) = 0 respectively for each i, j = 1, 2, ..., n. Then, we have:
Λ(x0) = Λ1(x
0) ∪ Λ2(x0) ∪ · · · ∪ Λn(x0)
Λ(y0) = Λ1(y
0) ∪ Λ2(y0) ∪ · · · ∪ Λn(y0)
In the next part of the proof we are going to map semi-algebraically
and non-expansively each Λj(x
0) onto each Λi(y
0). It is possible because
Λ(x0),Λ(y0) are semi-algebraic.
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2. Non− expansive maps
Take a collection of onto continuous maps [ϕj : Λ → Λ;ψi : Λ → Λ]
for i, j = 1, ..., n, with ϕj : Λj(x
0) → Λi(y0) and ψi : Λi(y0) → Λj(x0).
Let ‖ϕj(x0)− ϕj(x1)‖ ≤ ‖x0 − x1‖ and ‖ψi(y0)− ψi(y1)‖ ≤ ‖y0 − y1‖
for every x0,x1,y0,y1 ∈ Λ. These maps are:
ϕ1 : Λ1(x
0)  Λ1(y
0) : ψ1
ϕ2 : Λ2(x
0)  Λ2(y
0) : ψ2
...
ϕn : Λn(x
0)  Λn(y
0) : ψn
The semi-algebraicness of those maps follows from Λ(x0), Λ(y0) being
semi-algebraic. Their existence follows by Λ(x0), Λ(y0) being Urysohn.
In the next part of the proof we are going to find out the optimal strate-
gies throughout the fixed points of the latter maps.
3. Existence of a fixed point
We are going to prove that there exists an unique fixed point for each
of the latter semi-algebraic maps. Without loss of generality, let us use
the map ϕj. The procedure is the same for the others.
First, we are going to give a definition of semi-algebraic curve. A
semi-algebraic curve in Λ is a semi-algebraic application ι : (a, b) → Λ
for any (a, b) ∈ R+. We require ι to be continuous.
Second, we are going to use a criterion for selecting a semi-algebraic
curve. For every point a ∈ Cl(Λ)\Λ, there is a semi-algebraic continuous
curve ι : (0, b)→ Λ such that limt→0ι(t) = a, where Cl is closure.
Third, we are going to apply the criterion. Let ι : (0, a) → Λj(x0)
be an injective semi-algebraic curve with a > 0. The semi-algebraic set
{‖ϕj(ι(b))− ι(b)‖ = b ≥ 0} has arbitrary small elements.
Fix 0 <  /∈ (0, a). Let ι′ : (0 + 2, a + 2) → Λj(x0) be another
injective curve. There exists a limit for each one. Take that limit as the
limb→0ι
′(b) = limb→0ι(b+ 
2) = ι(2) = 2.
Then, we have ‖ϕj(ι(0))− ι(0)‖ = 2 from the compactness of Λj(x0),
but it is a contradiction because ‖ϕj(ι(0)) − ι(0)‖ = 0 from definition,
and also  6= 0. The curve must be defined over 0, its fixed point.
In the following part we are going to prove the uniqueness of the fixed
point of those maps.
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4. Uniqueness of the fixed point
In this part we prove the uniqueness of the optimal strategy. Let
us suppose ϕj, ψi have two different fixed points: x
0,x1 and y0,y1. It
implies ‖x0−x1‖ = ‖ϕj(x0)−ϕj(x1)‖ and ‖y0−y1‖ = ‖ϕj(y0)−ϕj(y1)‖.
However, because ϕj, ψi are non-expansive, ‖x0−x1| ≥ ‖ϕj(x0)−ϕj(x1)‖
and ‖y0 − y1‖ ≥ ‖ψi(y0)− ψi(y1)‖ contradict the first part. 
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